Endogenous growth models raise fundamental questions about the nature of human creativity, and the sorts of resources, skills, and knowledge inputs that shift the frontier of technology and production possibilities. Many argue that the nature of early British industrialization supports the thesis that economic advances depend on specialized scientific training or the acquisition of costly human capital. This paper examines the contributions of different types of knowledge to British industrialization, by assessing the backgrounds, education and inventive activity of the major contributors to technological advances in Britain during the crucial period between 1750 and 1930. The results indicate that scientists, engineers or technicians were not well-represented among the British great inventors until very late in the nineteenth century. Instead, important discoveries and British industrial advances were achieved by individuals who exercised commonplace skills and entrepreneurial abilities to resolve perceived industrial problems. For developing countries today, the implications are that costly investments in specialized human capital resources might be less important than incentives for creativity, flexibility, and the ability to make incremental adjustments that can transform existing technologies into inventions that are appropriate for prevailing domestic conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Endogenous growth models are based on the premise that knowledge and ideas comprise a significant source of economic progress. These models raise fundamental questions about the nature of human creativity, what sorts of resources, skills, and other personal characteristics are conducive to extraordinary achievements, and how those factors vary over time and with the field of endeavour. They imply that our understanding of early economic progress requires an assessment of the types of knowledge inputs which were in elastic supply, and were responsive to economic incentives. Walt Rostow, for instance, contended that one of the preconditions for economic and social advance is additions to scientific knowledge and technical applications, inputs which typically are scarce in many developing countries.
1 Nathan Rosenberg similarly highlights the determining role of science and the growth of specialized knowledge. 2 Others regard scientists as disinterested individuals who are motivated by intangible rewards such as enhanced reputations and honour, the desire to benefit mankind, or the pursuit of timeless truths, rather than material benefits. If highly specialized skills and scientific knowledge are prerequisites for generating productivity gains, but such inputs are in scarce or inelastic supply, this has important implications for development policy measures. These issues bear on the general question of whether creativity is induced by expansions in market demand, or depends on the acquisition of costly human capital that are largely unresponsive to perceived need.
These concerns have been widely debated, especially in the context of industrialization in
Britain and explanations for its subsequent loss of competitiveness. Still, little consensus has emerged from the plethora of contributions to this topic, in part because of a lack of systematic evidence. According to some, the theoretical elitist biases of the European scientific establishment 1 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 2 Rosenberg emphasizes that if we wish to understand economic progress "we must pay close attention to a special supply side variable: the growing stock of useful knowledge," and further states that "a large part of the economic history of the past 200 years" was due to science and specialized knowledge. Nathan Rosenberg, "Science, Invention and Economic Growth," Economic Journal, vol. 84 (333) 1974: 90-108 (p. 98, 104) .
matters" thesis go so far as to propose that "virtually all" inventors in Britain during the industrial revolution were influenced by scientific advances.
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David Landes is the most prominent proponent of the opposing thesis that science did not influence early British advances in technology, and researchers in this tradition concur that the industrial revolution "owed virtually nothing to science." 10 British innovations toward the end of the eighteenth century and at the start of the nineteenth century were largely produced by artisans with little formal education, who benefited from apprenticeships and on-the-job learning.
Significant problems such as the mechanical measurement of longitude at sea were resolved by relatively uneducated artisans, rather than through the application of abstract or formal scientific observation. A number of other studies highlight the reciprocal nature of interactions between industry and academic science. 11 For instance, Neil McKendrick's guarded conclusion was that science "played a necessary but not sufficient role." 12 Many such researchers emphasize that until the middle of the nineteenth century even the frontier of science and engineering was closer to organized intuition. More formal scientific endeavours of the day owed to skittish dons or aristocratic amateurs, whose efforts were directed to impractical pursuits and general principles in astronomy, magnetism, mathematics, botany and chemistry, rather than to useful knowledge that 9 Clifford Bekar and Richard Lipsey, "Science Institutions and the Industrial Revolution," Journal of European Economic History, 33 (3) Winter 2004, 709-753. 10 See A.R and M.B Hall, A Brief History of Science, Signet Library Books, 1964, p. 219: "The beginnings of modern technology in the so-called Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century owed virtually nothing to science, and everything to the fruition of the tradition of craft invention." 11 Donald Cardwell, The Development of Science and Technology in Britain, p. 483, refers to "the two-way relationship between science and technology," but implies that science benefited more from prior flows of technical insights. Paul Elliot, "The Birth of Public Science in the English Provinces: Natural Philosophy in Derby, c. ," Annals of Science, Vol. 57 Issue 1, 2000: 61-100, considers such Derby luminaries as John Whitehurst FRS, Thomas Simpson FRS and Benjamin Parker. He concluded that their experience pointed to the possibility that technology likely influenced scientific discovery and education as much as the reverse. 12 "The major pull came from the demand side of the economy rather than from the push of scientifically induced advance on the supply side. Indeed, in the hierarchy of causal significance, science would not rank very high, but that does not mean that it would not rank at all as a dependent variable, the latent potential of which was released by more commanding variable, it played a necessary but not sufficient role in easing the path of industrial success and economic progress." N. This paper focuses on the role of different types of knowledge in British industrialization, and offers a systematic estimation that defines scientific inputs specifically in terms of individuals with demonstrable scientific credentials. Clearly this approach has its drawbacks, but it also allows us to present empirical patterns, which can be compared to the more detailed and anecdotal historical accounts. The analysis is based on a sample of "great inventors" who were included in biographical dictionaries because of their contributions to technological progress. I traced the inventors who received formal training in science and engineering, as well as wider dimensions of achievement such as membership in the Royal Society, scientific eminence, publications, and the receipt of prizes and nonmonetary rewards. The variables from the biographical entries were further supplemented with information from patent records on the numbers of patents filed over 13 According to William Ashworth, An Economic History of England, 1870-1939, 1960, p. 27 , "heroic inventions" were predominantly made by craftsmen, and the alleged scientists were "enthusiastic amateurs with, at best, a very modest knowledge of scientific theory." 14 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, argues that the Industrial Revolution was due to an "Industrial Enlightenment." According to this perspective, those who focus simply on pure scientific discoveries miss much of the point, since valuable knowledge was drawn from a combination of tatonnement and conscious insight. However, Mokyr would likely agree that ultimately developments in science and engineering on the European continent led to advances in chemicals, steel, electricity, whereas the scientific and technical backwardness of British institutions and education contributed to its relative decline. 15 Squicciarini, Mara P. and Nico Voigtländer, "Human capital and industrialization : evidence from the age of enlightenment," NBER working paper series No. 20219, 2014. the individual's lifetime, the length of the inventor's patenting career, the industry in which he was active, and the degree of specialization at invention. 16 This approach allows us to examine the backgrounds, education and inventive activity of the major contributors to technological advances in Britain during the crucial period between 1750 and 1930, and to determine the extent to which such advances owed to specialized human capital and knowledge. More generally, the results have the potential to enhance our understanding of the determinants of shifts in the frontiers of technology during early economic development.
II.THE GREAT INVENTORS SAMPLE
The sample of "great inventors" was compiled from biographical dictionaries, including the 2004
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (DNB), and the Biographical Dictionary of the History of Technology (BD), among others. 17 The objective was to compile a sample of individuals who had made significant contributions to technological products and productivity. This accorded more with the intent of the BD, whose contributing authors were specialists in the particular technological field that they examined. The DNB's objective was somewhat different, for its editors intended to incorporate "not just the great and good, but people who have left a mark for any reason, good, bad, or bizarre." 18 The volume employed inconsistent terminology in the occupational titles of its biographies, and the mention of inventors or inventions either in the title or text did not necessarily imply that the person in question had made a significant contribution to 16 The discussion of broad scientific culture is informative and yields insights into the role of social capital in economic development. However, I chose to focus here on the evolution of contributions to useful knowledge, which are defined as additions to the social information set that have the potential to directly expand the production possibility frontier. Patent counts are used as a proxy for advances in such knowledge. Patents have well-known flaws that suggest that results should be interpreted with a sensitivity to their drawbacks, but they do offer the opportunity to adopt a more systematic approach to the relationship between science and technology in Although a few of the entries in any such sample would undoubtedly be debatable, this triangulation of sources minimizes the possibility of egregious error.
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One way to determine the extent of systematic sample bias is to estimate the probability that an inventor drawn from a particular biographical source (e.g. the DNB) was selected on different criteria relative to inventors from other sources. I computed a simple logistic regression model where the dependent variable was the probability that an inventor from our sample was included in the DNB, and the independent variables included all characteristics that we intended to investigate in this study, such as birth cohort, occupation, education, science background, patenting and publications records, and so on. ," Les Archives D'Invention (ed) Liliane HilairePerez (2005) ; B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "`Schemes of Practical Utility': Entrepreneurship and Innovation among `Great Inventors' During Early American Industrialization, 1790 -1865 ," Journal of Economic History, vol. 53 (2) 1993 . Other economic historians have used biographical information to explore the patterns and sources of important and exceptional innovation. For example, in his studies of painters, novelists and Nobel prize winners in economics, David Galenson has proposed a life cycle approach to creativity, and discerns two different types of innovators : "conceptual artists" or theorists who primarily make their most significant discoveries early in their careers ; whereas "experimental artists" or empiricists are those whose "genius" emerges later in the lifecycle after a long gestation period during which they accumulate the skills and knowledge to realize better and better contributions or creations. 24 A potential second candidate is Eleanor Coade (1733-1821), who is listed as the owner of an innovative stonemaking factory. However, her status as an inventor is completely speculative: there is no evidence that she was responsible for the innovations her factory produced, and they might well have been the product of her employees. Since part of our concern is with the contribution of this sort of specialized knowledge to innovation, the following section further explores the extent of formal training among the great inventors, and the role of education in science and engineering over the course of industrialization.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GREAT INVENTORS
Economic studies have shown the importance of appropriate institutions in promoting selfsustaining growth, and imply that the rate and direction of useful knowledge could be hampered, if not retarded, by flaws and inefficiencies in key institutions. As Sir Henry Sumner Maine suggests, Britain long remained an oligarchic society that was convinced that merit was causally related to inherited social class.
25 The United States arguably was able to assume economic leadership in part because institutions such as its educational and political systems offered inducements to all classes of society to contribute to the growth process, and allocated rewards that were commensurate with an individual's productivity rather than his social provenance. The
British educational system, in particular, failed to match up to institutes of higher learning in Germany and the United States and has been portrayed as a hindrance to economic advancement.
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However, the costs of such policies are a function of the degree to which productive economic activities depended on the acquisition of these sorts of human capital.
Figure 1 examines the distributions of great inventors by birth cohort in terms of their educational background. The great inventors were more educated than the general population, but these data make it is clear that formal training was not a prerequisite for important invention in the 25 According to Maine, "All that has made England famous, and all that has made England wealthy, has been the work of minorities, sometimes very small ones. It seems to me quite certain that, if for four centuries there had been a very widely extended franchise ... the threshing machine, the power loom, the spinning jenny, and possibly the steamengine, would have been prohibited," Sir Henry Maine, -1874) ) were apprenticed as millwrights in a colliery at an early age, but were able to achieve distinction in a number of arenas.
William Fairbairn, in particular, although he was self-taught, was appointed a member of the Academy of Science in France, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and President of the British Association. The military academies also allowed inventors to combine apprenticeships with more formal but somewhat diffuse training.
A fairly constant fraction of the great inventors obtained college degrees in general subjects such as divinity or the arts, which were unlikely to have contributed to their technological productivity. Over time, the importance of further education in science steadily increased.
Engineering proficiency was more discontinuous, and was associated with a jump in the technical orientation of 1821-1845 birth cohort; and 60 percent of all 27 inventors who received further education in engineering first produced inventions between 1871 and 1890. This is consistent with the earlier finding that scientific and technical invention became more prevalent after 1870. By the beginning of the twentieth century, a science or technical educational background was typical of the majority of great inventors and many even received advanced doctoral degrees in science.
However, it is not clear whether university attendance or degrees in science and engineering prevailed among inventors because such qualifications enhanced their skill at invention, or because a college degree was correlated with other arbitrary factors that gave these individuals preferment.
Donald Cardwell claimed that there were few institutional obstacles to innovation in England, for it was "a remarkably open society," and many of the inventive "heroes" in both science and technology were from humble origins. 28 Our data suggest otherwise. Table 3 shows that the common perception that the heroes of the British industrial revolution were primarily from modest backgrounds is somewhat overstated. Instead, an examination of the family backgrounds of the great inventors is more consistent with the notion that in the area of technological achievement elites were over-represented relative to the population. A third of the inventors did indeed come from farming, low-skilled or undistinguished (likely most of the unknown category)
backgrounds. However, the majority of the great inventors were born to families headed by skilled artisans, manufacturers, white collar workers, or well-off families in the elite and professional classes. A striking feature of the table is that the inventors with science training were twice as likely to belong to these elite and professional families, and this pattern is invariant over the entire period.
29 28 Cardwell, The Development of Science and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Britain, Ashgate: Variorum, 2003 . These specific claims are made in essays IV, p. 474; and VII, pp. 40-41. 29 Employers were averse to hiring college-educated workers. As the Times opined in 1897, "technical education is not needed for the masses of people. Indeed they are better without it ... [it] only teaches the workman to think that he is as good as his master" (cited in Cronin, p. 222) . Another perspective on this finding is to compare the social backgrounds of great inventors who attended college, across the two leading industrial nations of Britain and America. If it were true that elites prevailed because their privileged background and subsequent advantages in obtaining a college degree gave them an objective edge in technological creativity, we might expect little difference across An increasing fraction of inventors were educated at elite schools such as Oxford or Cambridge (Table 4) , institutions which were unlikely to offer much in the way of knowledge or skills that would add to either scientific or technological prowess. Advancement at these institutions primarily depended on excellence in liberal classical subjects, and the engineer John Perry even declared that "Oxford fears and hates natural science." 30 Cambridge had offered the Natural Science Tripos since 1848, but for much of the nineteenth century the impact was nominal. 31 The anti-pragmatism of Oxbridge was reflected even in the "red-brick" institutions that were established toward the end of the nineteenth century to remedy the lapses in the scientific and technical curricula of the older schools. 32 It is not surprising that serious British students of science and technology chose to pursue graduate studies in the German academies which were acknowledged as the world leaders in higher education in such fields as chemistry, physics and countries. In the period before 1820 college attendees in both countries predominantly belonged to elite families. However, after 1820 the share of elites shrinks noticeably in the United States, and the vast majority of graduates come from nonelite backgrounds, whereas the pattern in Britain remains for the most part unchanged. The United States had sent in place policies that facilitated human capital acquisition among the working class and led to social mobility through educational institutions, such as the Land Grant Act that subsidized universities. In Britain, and in England in particular, until the middle of the nineteenth century access to higher education was primarily available to the wealthy and those who adhered to the religious standards of the Establishment. Even though Dissenters were allowed to read for Oxbridge degrees after the 1850s, until 1873 they were precluded from holding fellowships at Cambridge. 30 See Janet Howarth, "Science Education in Late-Victorian Oxford: A Curious Case of Failure?" The English Historical Review, Vol. 102, No. 403. (Apr., 1987) , pp. 334-371. R. H. Tawney (Equality, 1931) wryly commented that the English "frisk into polite obsolescence on the playing fields of Eton." Along the same lines, Margaret Gowing (1978, p. 9) characterized English efforts at reforming its educational institutions at the end of the 19 th century as "too little and too late." She attributes this to inadequate funding, the influence of social class and the Church, and poor administration. 31 For an interesting analysis, see Roy Macleod and Russell Moseley, "The 'Naturals' and Victorian Cambridge: Reflections on the Anatomy of an Elite, 1851 -1914 ," Oxford Review of Education, vol. 6 (2) 1980 . As late as 1880 only 4 percent of Cambridge undergraduates read for the NSTs and most were destined for occupations such as the clergy and medicine. The method of teaching eschewed practical laboratory work; and there was a general disdain among the Dons for the notion that science should be directed toward professional training; so it is not surprising that only 4 percent of the NST graduates entered industry. Students who did take the NSTs tended to perform poorly because of improper preparation and indifferent teaching, especially in colleges other than Trinity, Caius and St. John's. Chairs in Engineering were created in Cambridge in 1875 and in Oxford in 1907, whereas MIT alone had seven engineering professors in 1891. 32 Sarah V. Barnes, "England's Civic Universities and the Triumph of the Oxbridge Ideal," History of Education Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 3. (Autumn, 1996) , pp. 271-305, finds a tendency for the red-brick universities to be regarded as second-rate, and for the classical Oxbridge approach to be regarded as a superior model in a "triumph of tradition." Part of the problem was financial, since most professors had to pay for their research expenditures out of their meagre salaries. Even at the Scottish universities, which were widely regarded as leaders in science education in Britain, few nonmedical students had the opportunity to participate in laboratories or research. See Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to enquire into the Universities of Scotland: Returns and Documents, Parliamentary Papers xxxv (1878): 336-340. engineering. However, it might be expected that opportunities for a foreign education were also correlated with a secure social and financial background. Table 4 shows that the rather privileged background of many of the British great inventors is reflected in other dimensions of elite standing. Twenty nine percent of the inventors who were active before 1820 had families who were connected to those in power or who were otherwise distinguished. An interesting facet of the relationship between privilege, science, and technological achievement in Britain is reflected in the ninety great inventors who were also appointed as Fellows the Royal Society. The Royal Society was founded in 1660 as an "invisible college" of natural philosophers who included Isaac Newton, Christopher Wren, Robert Hooke and Robert Boyle. Fellows of the Society were elected and many of the members consisted of individuals who were not professional scientists but who were wealthy or well-connected. 33 Although the Royal Society was associated with the foremost advances in science, many of its projects were absurd and impractical. 34 The Royal Society was widely criticized for its elitist and unmeritocratic policies. 35 Fellowes, 1830. Babbage noted that "those who are ambitious of scientific distinction, may, according to their fancy, render their name a kind of comet, carrying with it a tail of upwards of forty letters, at the average cost of 10₤. 9s. 9d. per letter. It should be observed, that all members contribute equally, and that the sum now required is fifty pounds ... The amount of this subscription is so large, that it is calculated to prevent many men of real science from entering the Society, and is a very severe tax on those who do so." 36 Babbage regretted that "in England, particularly with respect to the more difficult and abstract sciences, we are much below other nations, not merely of equal rank, but below several even of inferior power. That a country, club and, despite a series of reforms, did not become a genuine professional scientific organization until after the 1870s. Even in 1860 more than 66 percent of its membership consisted of nonscientists and medical practitioners, whose inclusion was not altogether merited on the basis of their scientific contributions. 37 In short, scarce human capital was not a significant factor in important inventive activity during the period of early industrialization. Moreover, it is also possible that the prevalence of professional backgrounds at the start of the twentieth century might owe to the role of elites in British society, rather than to the contributions that specialized knowledge made to technological innovation.
IV. PATENTS, PRODUCTIVITY AND MARKET INCENTIVES
Rostow had proposed the hypothesis that prospects for growth depended on specialized knowledge inputs that were inelastic and in scarce supply. The data set of great inventors instead suggests that science was only weakly related to technology in early industrialization. A more speculative conclusion is that an elite background might have played some role in promoting distinction among scientist-inventors in British society, with the possibility that such training did not necessarily increase productivity at invention relative to other great inventors. Some researchers further suggest that, especially during the early stages of industrialization, scientists were not sensitive to market factors, which would imply that they would tend to respond inelastically to economic conditions. This section therefore uses patent records through 1890 to compare eminently distinguished for its mechanical and manufacturing ingenuity, should be indifferent to the progress of inquiries which form the highest departments of that knowledge on whose more elementary truths its wealth and rank depend, is a fact which is well deserving the attention of those who shall inquire into the causes that influence the progress of nations. productivity at invention among scientists and nonscientists, and the extent to which scientist inventors were responsive to market incentives.
Patent records have well-known flaws as a gauge of invention, but they have still proved to be valuable in identifying the sources of variation over time and place in the rate, organization, and direction of inventive activity. 38 Table 5 shows that approximately 87 percent of the British sample of great inventors were patentees. Charles Wheatstone reported that "some thought it not quite consistent with the habits of a scientific man to be concerned in a patent," but it is noticeable that the proportion of patentees is similar across all science classes, whether proxied by educational background, scientific eminence, or membership in the premier Royal Society. 39 In the case of the United States, where patent institutions were extremely favourable to inventors of all classes, almost all (97 percent) great inventors chose to obtain patent protection for their inventions. The British great inventors overall exhibit a somewhat lower propensity to patent, but this seems more related to institutional factors that affected all inventors, rather than to scientific disdain for material returns.
In particular, there is a marked increase in the propensity to patent after 1851. This period stands out because in 1852 the British patent laws were reformed in the direction of the American system in ways that increased access to patent institutions, and strengthened the security of property rights in patents. The patent records also enable us to examine whether a science background increased productivity at invention. Again, the patterns are consistent with the notion that at least until 1870 a background in science did not add a great deal to inventive productivity. If scientific knowledge gave inventors a marked advantage, it might be expected that they would demonstrate greater creativity at an earlier age than those without such human capital. Inventor scientists were marginally younger than nonscientists, but both classes of inventors were primarily close to middle age by the time they obtained their first invention (and note that this variable tracks inventions rather than patents). Productivity in terms of average patents filed and career length are also similar among all great inventors irrespective of their scientific orientation. Thus, the kind of knowledge and ideas that produced significant technological contributions during British industrialization seem to have been rather general and available to all creative individuals, regardless of their scientific training. Tables 7 and 8 show the relationship between inventive activity and different instruments for specialized human capital. Table 7 examines variation in industrial specialization, or the fraction of an inventor's patents that were filed in a particular industry. The results show that specialization was higher in the Northern counties such as Yorkshire, but this was largely because of the concentration of industries. Technical education, or training in engineering and technology, was associated with higher sectoral specialization. However, elite degrees from Oxford or Cambridge, degrees in science, or publications of books and articles, all indicated lower tendencies for specialization, and all of these variables added little to the overall explanatory power of the model. These results are bolstered by the finding that such industries as agriculture and construction were less likely to be specialized, whereas patents for textiles and the electrical industries, as might be expected, went to inventors who were more specialized.
Total career patents comprise another measure of human capital in inventive activity, since inventors with greater numbers of patents would be more likely to have accumulated larger stocks of knowledge through learning by doing. Career patents were higher in the South of England, where markets were more extensive. The results for the patentee's science and technology knowledge are consistent with those for industrial specialization. Elite education, science degrees, or research and development did not lead to higher patenting over an inventor's career. Career patents were higher for inventors who had engineering degrees but, as the descriptive statistics indicated, engineering qualifications were prevalent only later in the century.
The overall empirical findings together suggest that, by focusing their efforts in a particular industry, relatively uneducated inventors were able to acquire sufficient knowledge that allowed them to make valuable additions to the available technology set. After 1820, as the market expanded and created incentives to move out of traditional industries such as textiles and engines, both scientists and nonscientists responded by decreasing their specialization. The patent reforms in 1852 encouraged the nonscience-oriented inventors to increase their investments in sectoral specialization, but industrial specialization among the scientists lagged significantly. This is consistent with the arguments of such scholars as Joel Mokyr, who argued that any comparative advantage from familiarity with science was likely based on broad unfocused capabilities such as rational methods of analysis that applied across all industries. The time path of specialization is especially informative in terms of electrical and telecommunications technology, which required more technical knowledge inputs than traditional areas such as textiles. Electrical innovation was also heavily specialized across region, and two thirds of all related patented inventions were filed by residents of London. The expansion in this industry after the 1870s was associated with a greater marginal return for those with formal education, and this likely induced the substantive specialization in this industry among scientist-inventors, as well as college-educated engineers.
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The experience of the British great inventors also shed light on the reward systems that are frequently recommended as substitutes for patents. 41 Prizes and medals, in particular, might be more effective inducements than patents if scientists were motivated by the desire simply for the recognition of their peers and not by financial incentives. Between1826 to 1914 the Royal Society, for example, awarded 173 medals, 67 of which were given for work in mathematics, astronomy and experimental physics, and only two to engineers. 42 However, many were disillusioned with this award system, attributing outcomes to arbitrary factors such as personal influence, the persistence of one's recommenders, or the self-interest of the institution making the award. The timing also seemed ineffective, since the majority of premia were made later in life to those who had already attained eminence. The likelihood that an inventor had received prizes and medals 40 The Society of Telegraph Engineers (later the Institution of Electrical Engineers) was founded in London in 1871 by eight men, and rapidly became one of the largest societies in Britain. Its membership rose from 352 in 1871 (8.5 percent of all enrollment in engineering institutions) to 2100 (14.0 percent) in 1890 and 4000 (17.2 percent) in 1910. Even these professional institutions resisted formal education, and apprenticeships remained the favoured mode of human capital acquisition among the engineering class examinations until the end of the 19 th century. See Buchanan, 1985. 41 See B. Zorina Khan, "Premium Inventions: Patents and Prizes as Incentive Mechanisms in Britain and the United States, " in Dora L. Costa and Naomi R. Lamoreaux (eds), Understanding Long-Run Economic Growth: Geography, Institutions, and the Knowledge Economy, NBER and University of Chicago (2011): . 42 Roy M. MacLeod, "Of Medals and Men: A Reward System in Victorian Science, 1826-1914," Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 26, No. 1. (Jun., 1971) , pp. 81-105. was higher for unspecialized scientific men, moreso for those who had gained recognition as famous scientists or Fellows of the Royal Society, or who had influential connections. Prizes and medals tended to be awarded to the same individuals who had already received patents and, indeed, prizes were associated with higher numbers of patents. The incremental value of these awards was therefore likely to be somewhat low -not because scientists were unresponsive to incentives, but because their response was higher for financial motivations. It is not surprising that by 1900 the Council of the Royal Society decided to change its emphasis from the allocation of medals to the financing of research. These patterns may have owed in part to the character of the British educational system which largely restricted access to higher education to the privileged classes in the nineteenth century. 46 The evidence on educational institutions is particularly striking when one contrasts the British experience to the United States. College graduates from elite universities, especially those in science and technical fields, were generally better represented among great inventors in Britain than in the U.S. There were stark differences in the distribution of education attainments, as well as in the class backgrounds of those who were able to go to college, between the two countries.
College education was not so prevalent among the US inventors until quite late in the 19 th century, but graduates were drawn from a much broader range of social classes (judging from the occupations of the fathers). Thus, it is likely that the proportion of great inventors who were scientists in the UK actually overstate the importance of a science education for making a significant contribution to technological knowledge. Despite the advantages that people from their class backgrounds had at invention, scientists were not well-represented among the great British inventors nor among patentees during the height of industrial achievements.
Economic historians of Britain have pointed out that its early economic growth was unbalanced and productivity advances were evident in only a few key sectors. Moreover, significant increases in total factor productivity growth were not experienced until the middle of the nineteenth century. The reasons for these patterns have not been fully elaborated on. (1878) Commissions ---outlined the inadequacy of British science and its institutions of scientific and technical training. Enrollments in science classes at the secondary school level were "negligible;" and university science was "seriously deficient in quantity and quality." Despite the frequent investigations by Commissions of this sort, reform was "miserably slow." (Gowing, 1978) Sir Eric Ashby, Technology and the Academics, p 7, considered British academic science to be "dogmatic and dessicated" until after the middle of the nineteenth century. Peter Alter, The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in Britain, 1850 -1920 , New York: Berg, 1987 More generally, the experience of the First Industrial Nation indicates that creativity that enhances economic efficiency is somewhat different from additions to the most advanced technical discoveries. The sort of creativity that led to spurts in economic and social progress comprised insights that were motivated by perceived need and by institutional incentives. In the twenty-first century, specialized human capital and scientific knowledge undoubtedly enhance and precipitate economic growth in the developed economies. However, for developing countries with scarce human capital resources, such inputs at the frontier of "high technology" might be less relevant than the ability to make incremental adjustments that can transform existing technologies into inventions that are appropriate for the domestic conditions. As Thomas Jefferson pointed out, a small innovation that can improve the lives of the mass of the population might be more economically important than a large technological discovery that benefits only the few. 
